Governing Egypt and Turkey: Unexpected Relationships Among Nature, Architecture, Power and Politics

MA in Research Architecture

A Dissertation Submitted to Centre for Research Architecture
Department of Visual Cultures

Goldsmiths, University of London

Selman CELIK (33246801)

September 2013

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my personal tutor John Palmesino for his contributions and motivations during my study. I also like to express my high gratitude to Andy Lowe for all the help and guidance he has provided for me throughout my studies. I should acknowledge all my colleagues who contributed to this work by their support and ideas. I feel so grateful to my parents for their emotional supports.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction
2. Geopolitics
    2.1. Ancient Egypt
        2.1.1. The Nile River
        2.1.2. The Pyramids
    2.2. Modern Turkey
        2.2.1. Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP)
        2.2.2. Canal Istanbul Project
3. Participation in Governing
    3.1. Cybernetics
        3.1.1. The Cybernetics of the Pyramids
        3.1.2. The Cybernetics of Turkish Politics
    3.2. Conflicts and Reactions
        3.2.1. Processes in the short run
            3.2.1.1. The Internal Political Battle of Turkey
            3.2.1.2. Taksim Gezi Park Riots
            3.2.1.3. The Arab Spring in Egypt
            3.2.1.4. Riots, Military Coup and Massacre in Egypt
        3.2.2. Processes in the long run
            3.2.2.1. The Anthropocene
4. Conclusion
5. Bibliography
6. List of Figures

1. Introduction

The relationship between physical environment of human and its effects has been researched throughout the history. Geology (the science that deals with the dynamics and physical history of the earth) and politics (the science of public policies and political processes) are two different areas to discover in this matter. However, the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen uses the notion of ‘geopolitics’ in 1899 to make complex relations between geology and politics.[1] The dissertation firstly focuses on Ancient Egypt and Modern Turkey in terms of geopolitics to arrive at further points.

As a second element, the research handles the notions of governing and participation. In terms of the regions, it asks the questions how could the River Nile and the pyramids of Ancient Egypt be governed and what are the governing attempts in Southeastern Anatolia Region in Modern Turkey in terms of maintenance of the political power. In this context, with these research questions, the dissertation intends to have a discourse in which the nature, architecture, power and politics are discussed together with their unexpected relationships.

To reveal these relationships, the work investigates the cybernetic aspects of the political systems and the emergence of the Anthropocene. Reconsidering the pyramids of the pharaohs and the geological projects of the current Turkish government in terms of governing and the Anthropocene brings new questions to the research. In addition, the riots and other reactions of the political stakeholders suddenly become very significant in terms of governing compared to the old regimes in both countries.

Through the actions, the relationship between space and politics emerges. In this process, virtual platforms (such as the social media) become alternative spaces without political and formal limitations and affect the future of both countries themselves and the whole Middle East. All these interactions determine the new policies of making countries and governing. The dissertation also tries picturing the infrastructure of the interactions over Egypt and Turkey.

2. Geopolitics
2.1. Ancient Egypt
2.1.1. The Nile River


Figure 1. Satellite Image of Egypt and the Region

When a satellite image of Egypt (fig. 1) is analyzed, it can be easily agreed that the Nile River with its valley (and delta) is one of the major resources of Egypt. The Nile has a great significance since the pharaohs’ time to the present due to the fact that it is “the heart of regional economy, politics and culture”.[2] The governments are making future plans throughout the Nile by controlling the river water.[3] At this point, the question of how the Nile is governed starts becoming the main issue on the region.

Ancient Egypt civilization starts rising around 3000 BC.[4] There are notable signs that the river bed and floodplain of the Nile in Egypt have slowly shaped the civilization in Egypt throughout the Nile.[5] Therefore, autonomous confederations of Ancient Egypt had to control the Nile in their own land. As a result of this, after a while, the Nile basin would become “the first international river basin where modern states entered into agreements about the sharing of water”.[6] The Nile was so important for Ancient Egypt that most of the earliest Egyptians were farmers who lived near the Nile and agriculture was the major way of surviving.[7] Furthermore, due to the fact that agriculture was beyond the capacity of individual working, the desires of agriculture in Egypt revealed and improved the social organization along the Nile.[8]

As the source of the life, “the waters of the Nile come from the Blue Nile, which rises in the Ethiopian highlands, and the While Nile, which rises south of Lake Victoria in central Africa and recieves water from many smaller rivers in southern Sudan”.[9] From the aspect of economics, the Nile has been the easiest way of transportation to other countries for commerce and has supplied the wealth of the Egyptian Nation.[10]

To emphasize the importance of the Nile in terms of transportation, the Suez Canal which is an artificial waterway in Egypt, connecting the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea, and the Suez crisis could be shown as relevant examples. The canal was opened in 1869 after 10 years of work.[11] Afterwards, it gained such importance in a short while that it has become one of the major petroleum way of the most powerful countries of the world. In July 1956, Egypt nationalised the canal and it resulted in a big world crisis.[12] Suddenly, Egypt, United Kingdom, France and Israel became belligerents of the crisis.[13] When looked at the history, the first canal between the Nile and the Red Sea was dug about 4000 years ago when the pharaohs were ruling Ancient Egypt.[14] Considering the Nile Delta, it can be said that the pharaohs might already aimed to make a way connecting the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea.

2.1.2. The Pyramids

Pharaohs of Egypt have left a different architecture to Egyptians. Without doubt, the most eye-catching figures of this architecture are the pyramids. Beginning from the early dynastic period to the 30th dynasty of the kingdom, many kings and pharaohs of Ancient Egypt have built their own pyramids.[15] According to Egyptologists, because religion and the gods were one of the major elements of the life in Ancient Egypt, the pyramids could have been used as in three functions: monument, temple and monument-temple.[16] There are several theories on how they were built, but the dissertation rather aims to focus on their significance in terms of geopolitics – the invisible functions of the pyramids on the whole nation.


Figure 2. The Standard Pyramid Complex

As a religious function, since the pharaoh (king) was a god simultaneously, “each pyramid was also the focus of a temple complex maintained by a priesthood long after the pharaoh had been laid to rest”.[17] The Greek historian Heredotus also mentions the importance of religion and beliefs to pharaohs in Ancient Egypt in his book named Histories.[18] In this context, it could be easily said that the religious qualifications of the pharaohs provided supplementary elements to their absolute power and the pyramid complexes (fig. 2) were the most appropriate architectures to make the Egyptians feel the authority of the pharaohs. On the other hand, for instance, the Ancient Egypt researcher Robert Bauval claims that the alignments and some architectural decisions of the pyramids in the Giza Plataeu were inspired by the relationships that were thought among the pharaohs, stars and the gods.[19]

When looked at the geological conditions, the pyramids are located throughout the Nile River.[20] An obvious reason for this is that the most of the landscape of Egypt is covered with desert and the stone quarries that are required for building the pyramids exist along the Nile River.[21] To some extent, it could be said that the pyramids have a strong intercourse with the landscape because they were only built with natural construction materials – stones. On the other hand, the overall locations of the pyramids also reveal some clues on construction policies and political decisions of Ancient Egyptians. For instance, though the pyramids are located along the Nile and there are many residential areas in the Lower Egypt, there is no pyramid in the Nile Delta area. With a closer look, it can be easily seen that the pyramids are located in special areas that have geopolitical significance. Especially, the Giza plateau where the largest Egyptian pyramids were built in is an accurate place to build a pyramid in terms of both the geological and political conditions of Ancient Egypt.

However, from the political perspective, each pyramid clearly starts representing the power of its owner. Beyond this aspect, the Albanian writer Ismail Kadare claims in his book The Pyramid (1996) that the pyramids of Ancient Egypt had to be built whether the pharaohs want or not. He supports his claim with the argument that a pyramid is a perfect way of keeping the nation under control during its construction by having many people worked for his pyramid and also making them part of his power simultaneously.[22] When the construction periods of the pyramids are considered, they almost overlap the periods of suzerainty durations of pharaohs.[23]

2.2. Modern Turkey
2.2.1. Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP)

Modern governments have advanced-level geopolitics projects within more details. Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) is one of the major projects of Turkey, which has not only agricultural aims but also multi-sectoral and socio-economic development plans starting from the 1970s. The GAP handles the southeastern region of Turkey that includes the cities of Adiyaman, Batman, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Siirt, Sanliurfa and Sirnak (fig. 3).


Figure 3. Turkey and Southeastern Anatolia Region

Although the GAP is identified as a regional project, the dissertation researches the nationwide effects of the project. When looked at GAP from a different perspective, political desires of the governments that have become part of GAP so far suddenly start coming into the open. As a starting point, the political background of the region gives some clues to make a strong relationship between GAP and the governing of Turkey.

According the demographic data, the residents of the Southeastern Turkey live as large families.[24] These large families are very interested in politics of Turkey and they believe that economic issues are the major problems of the country.[25] On the other hand, it could be said that the majority of the population deals with agriculture in the region and a considerable part of the region’s economy is based on agriculture.[26] At this point, GAP emerges as a governing practice that builds a bridge between the residents and the government. Thus, most likely, every government that comes to power tries to adopt and develop GAP more in details rather than refusing it just because it was one of the projects of former governments.

On the other hand, from a political perspective, the region has had ‘the Kurdish issue’ since the 1980s.[27] In some degree, the Turkish governments have tried dominating the Kurdish population in the east of Turkey.[28] Although, the issue was seen as terrorism because of the actions of PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in the first process, then it has been agreed as a social problem that needs to be solved.[29] As a solution, the existing GAP has been rather developed in order to improve relations with the local people.[30] Thus, it could be said that, to one extent, the Kurdish issue directed GAP in a political way rather than being just a geological project.

In addition, it also reveals the political desires of the government that the 2002 regional development plan of GAP addresses terror events for the inability of the former works on GAP.[31] In other words, the government tries to encourage the residents avoid the incitement of PKK and also make them support government’s future plans on the region. In response to the attempts of the Turkish governments, the Kurdish had to establish their own political parties as new and alternative political actors in the region.[32]

On the other hand, beyond the political desires, the southeastern region of Turkey is still the least developed part of the country due to the fact that the geological conditions are quite heavy in the region. In this context, every government intends recreating the region and offers a new perception on the region and its users. However, it is also an important fact at this point that every successful attempt of GAP brings more reliance to the governments. When the conditions and the situation of GAP are compared to the Ancient Egypt and the buildings of the pyramids, it starts emergence that though it has been 4500 years and the governing structures have mostly changed, the attempts to maintain political power and support of public through geological transformations are quite similar. Therefore, Ancient Egypt and Modern Turkey start being seen quite related to each other in terms of geopolitics.

2.2.2. Canal Istanbul Project

One of the last projects of the AK Party Government in Turkey is Canal Istanbul which aims to open an artificial sea-level waterway on the European side of Istanbul between the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea as an alternative to the Bosphorus. After the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s presentation, Canal Istanbul is also known as ‘the crazy project’ in the Turkish media.[33]


Figure 4. Satellite Image of Istanbul

Figure 5. Planned Canal Istanbul Project

The canal is proposed to be 40 to 50 kilometers in length, at 150 meters wide and 25 meters deep.[34] Erdogan describes Canal Istanbul as “an urban planning project, a family project, a housing project… [and] an environmental project”.[35] Actually, from another perspective, the Prime Minister of Turkey wants to move the city and its people to the west of Istanbul and create a new city that will be his work in which the people will have new employment facilities and new life schemes. In other words, Erdogan uses geological transformations as similar as the pharaohs did 4500 years ago. Moreover, he purposes to finish Canal Istanbul by the year of 2023 as well as for his other projects.[36] Basically, he wants to guarantee his governing process through his projects as the pharaohs did in Ancient Egypt by building the pyramids.

3. Participation in Governing

Although the governing structures of Ancient Egypt and Turkey are quite different than each other, the residents of both countries could participate in governing as long as their internal dynamics of politics let them. Absolutism is on one hand and democracy is on the other hand in terms of Ancient Egypt and Turkey. However, the dissertation explores the correlations on both of the political structures and attempts making points between them.

In this context, Nick Wates and Charles Knevitt (1987) state that political orders’ power holders cannot be the only decision makers on the public and therefore they use the term of ‘community architecture’ to seek the ways of participation in both architecture and governing.[37] In other words, community architecture could be seen as a unique idea to encourage people participate in politics indirectly but makes them become other stakeholders of politics. Hereby, to reveal the relationship between architecture and governing, the dissertation enters the area of cybernetics.

3.1. Cybernetics

Since the notion of cybernetics was defined as “the science of control and communication in the animal and the machine” by the mathematician Norbert Wiener (1948) for the first time[38], it has started to be investigated in many different disciplines, especially in the Macy conferences. In fact, the term cybernetics was derived from the Greek word kybernetes. “It first appears in Antiquity with Plato, and in the 19th century with Ampère, who both saw it as the science of effective government”.[39]

On the other hand, it is said that cybernetics, basically, discovers systems, their loops and control mechanisms. However, “after the control engineering and computer science disciplines had become fully independent, the remaining cyberneticists felt the need to clearly distinguish themselves from these more mechanistic approaches, by emphasizing autonomy, self-organization, cognition, and the role of the observer in modelling a system”.[40] Afterwards, cyberneticians have made a clear distinction as the first order cybernetics – ‘the cybernetics of the observed systems’ – and the second order cybernetics – ‘the cybernetics of the observing systems’.[41] In this context, politics emerges as a harmony of complex governmental relationships with their mechanisms and loops.

From a larger perspective, the English Cybernetician Gordon Pask clarifies the architectural relevance of cybernetics with its statement that architecture has always designed systems for the Earth.[42] Hereby, it could be said that architecture is a kind of bridge between the nature and governing due to the fact that the power holders need architecture to provide permanent services. However, when the power holders start performing oversized architectures, the usage of architecture starts operating in different ways for other aims apart from just serving the residents.

3.1.1. The Cybernetics of the Pyramids

Considering the pyramids of Ancient Egypt as the signs of the power puts them in the middle of a hierarchical loop/system. In fact, the pyramid complexes were also designed to be “an economic engine, deploying people and redistributing goods”.[43] They were seen as the bridges to the Afterlife.[44]

Heredotus claims that 100,000 men have been worked for 20 years to build the great pyramid of Khufu which is the oldest of the seven wonders of the world, and the only one to remain largely intact.[45] According to Karl Butzer (1976), the population in the old kingdom was around 1.6 million.[46] Hereby, it can be said that a great amount of people worked for the great pyramid and the all who worked for the pyramid became a component of the power of the pharaoh. If so, who did remain to revolt against the pharaoh?

When the political system of the pharaohs’ age is analyzed, all classes are hierarchically divided as respectively; the pharaoh, viziers, nobles, priests, scribes, soldiers, craftsmen, farmers and slaves. Furthermore, when they all are put in a scheme by their numbers, the scheme looks like a pyramid from the pharaoh to the slaves. However, when these classes are reconsidered as a system from a cybernetic perspective, though the pharaoh is seen as the absolute ruler at the top, he is actually ruled by the governing system of Ancient Egypt itself. The pharaoh seems managing the power but on the other hand the system directs him according to its rules. Though the pharaoh is a semi-god, he is limited with the system and its loops’ needs due to the fact that all the actions of the classes affect each other and the whole power itself. From this aspect, Ismail Kadare’s book The Pyramid which was referenced above takes on an entirely new meaning.

3.1.2. The Cybernetics of Turkish Politics

The Ottoman Empire was at stake in the 20th century. After the proclamation of the republic in 1923, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk established a new political system for Turkey and then the Turkish met democracy.[47] Nevertheless, there was only one political party – Republican People’s Party (CHP) – in the Turkish Parliament until the 1950 elections. Thus, the system was like a closed loop without control mechanisms for a long while. However, Turkey met the multi-party system in 1950 through the Democratic Party (DP) and the political order has become a complete system with multi stakeholders.

With the multi-party system, Turkey has had five groups of political stakeholders: governments, opposition political parties, non-governmental organizations, vocational organizations and the military.[48] The governments have been always monitored by the other stakeholders of the political system as if they have been the feedback loops of the whole system. Hereby, to one extent, the Turkish political order could be seen as a first order cybernetic system though it is not so. However, it can be said that, compared to the pharaohs’ system in Ancient Egypt, the Turkish system has obvious control and feedback mechanisms.

3.2. Conflicts and Reactions
3.2.1. Processes in the short run
3.2.1.1. The Internal Political Battle of Turkey

The loops of the political system of Turkey have failed from time to time. For instance, the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and two other ministers were executed as a result of the first military coup in 1961.[49] The conflicts among the stakeholders of the Turkish political order have revealed the internal political war starting from the 1950s to the present.[50] The power has started not to be seen as if it has only one owner/ruler by the public and the political stakeholders. As a result of this, the conflicts and tussles on governing have become obvious and physical rather than being only hidden and psychological.

On the other hand, it can be also said that the internal battle has encouraged the public to participate more in governing. Non-governmental organizations and vocational organizations, for example, have become the stakeholders of the system though they are not established as political associations. The apolitical have also had their rights to be part of the system that also affects them.

3.2.1.2. Taksim Gezi Park Riots

At the beginning of June 2013, Taksim Gezi Park in Istanbul was occupied by demonstrators. It was because of an environmental issue but then became a nationwide riot against the government.[51] The demonstrators had different complains but most were against Erdogan and his AK PARTY (Justice and Development Party).[52] The riots have been taken place until the middle of June.


Figure 6. Gezi Park Riots in Taksim Square

However, unsurprisingly, the centre and the starting place of the riots was the centre of the internal political battle referenced above: Taksim Square. It is one of the few places to show political existence and power in Turkey. In other words, it can be said that Taksim Square is a spacial platform in which the cybernetics of Turkish politics is observed. Therefore, it is the spatial evidence of the second order cybernetic system of Turkish politics. If Taksim Square is compared to the pyramids of Ancient Egypt, both the pyramids and the square could be seen as the sign of the actual power that belongs with nobody, but the system itself.

3.2.1.3. The Arab Spring in Egypt

After thousands of years, there was still absolutism since the pharaohs until the 21th century in Egypt. However, the political system of Egypt could not resist anymore. As a result, starting from Tunis in 2011, the political orders of the Middle East countries have highly restructured.[53] In this process, particularly, the social media has become a new platform for those who want to participate in governing and politics.[54] For instance, the Egyptians against the President Hosni Mubarak had met in Tahrir Square and the main source of information of the calls for the square was only the social media.[55]


Figure 7. Tahrir Square Celebrations, After Mubarak’s Resignation

In addition, the desire of participation in politics became so high that the word ‘Egypt’ was determined as the most used world on twitter in 2011.[56] In other words, the social media became the cyber platform of the politics and it was the main factor that let the public squares were turned into the local parliaments in which the residents declare their opinions and show their existence. Though it was not planned so from the beginning, the social media has become the control mechanism of the countries that had closed loops in their political systems.

3.2.1.4. Riots, Military Coup and Massacre in Egypt

The internal political battle of Tukey that was described above has been still in progress for more than 60 years. However, the Egyptians started having political conflicts just two years after the revolution in Egypt. The Egyptians had a demanding process for a democratically elected government because the internal political actors were not obvious enough.

However, though the elected government has started working, the conflicts have increased in parallel. Mohamed Morsi, who is a member of Muslim Brothers, came to power as the fifth and first democratically elected president on 30 June 2012.[57] After only one year, the Egyptians started meeting in public squares again to protest the religious activities of the president.[58] The protests has spread in a short while and eventually a military coup was taken place on 03 July 2013.[59] Morsi was removed from his post and afterwards the Morsi supporters started being killed by the military in a short while.[60] In other words, though the revolution of the Arab Spring was seen the guarantor of democracy, the opponents and the military did not let the first elected president proceed until the next elections and the democracy in Egypt could resist for only one year.

3.2.2. Processes in the long run
3.2.2.1. The Anthropocene

The scientists Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer used the term ‘anthropocene’ to clarify the influence of human kind on earth as a new epoch in 2000 and the term has become very popular in terms of many disciplines. The general emphasis of the term is that because the human beings have continuously modified the planet, it caused changes on ecosystems. For instance, climate changes all around the world and global warming are the most obvious symptoms of the anthropocene.

When the pyramids of Ancient Egypt are considered in terms of the anthropocene, they could be seen as one of the large-scale influences that caused the emergence of the anthropocene. It is because of the fact that the pharaohs had moved the sand and stones in the landscape to reveal their pyramids. By doing so, they created man-made mountains in the middle of the deserts of Egypt. In addition, not only the pharaohs but also the current rulers of Egypt have used and modified the Nile River as a major source of the whole country. Moreover, they even created artificial waterways and lakes in the landscape such as Suez Canal and Lake Nasser.

Similarly, the long-term GAP project of the Turkish includes many geological transformations in the most of the southeastern region of the country. The project, for instance, aims to recreate the region and its vegetation by building large-scale dams such as Keban Dam. Additionally, the Canal Istanbul project of the current Turkish government also needs to be considered in terms of the Anthropocene in the long run due to the fact that it is going to divide Istanbul into three – one island and two peninsulas – and make a new Bosphorus.

In fact, there is no need to wait for the local signs of the anthropocene because they already exist in the landscapes. For instance, when looked at the pyramids of Ancient Egypt, most of them are now eroded like actual mountains and are filled by the sand. To some extent, these changes have two meanings: the nature and landscape are having their revenge and those man-made transformation products are becoming part of the nature by losing their intended functions in the epoch of the anthropocene.

4. Conclusion

From the present back to the age of the pharaohs, geological transformations and architecture have been always used by the power holders. However, the French Anthropologist Bruno Latour states that “we have never been modern”.[61] He defends his statement with that it is because the scientific power that has to represent the objects of society and the political power that has to represent the subjects of society are always separated from each other during the struggle of human beings on Earth.[62]

To clarify the issue, the notion of ‘idealization’ might be referred at this point. There is always a trajectory proposed before an action happens and it is usually imagined as if it has a straight route. However, the nature and geological characteristics of a state could be a base model for governing the state. In this context, geopolitics gains a new and different dimension. As a complementary element, the science of cybernetics reveals the the most reasonable way to start with in terms of governing.

In the Ancient Egypt case, the role model of the landscape is the Nile River. It actually has regulated Egypt a country. The route of the river has allowed the pharaohs and current powers make the whole nation state. Because of absolutism, governing was very limited in predetermined borders. However, the new cybernetics of governing has emerged through the Arab Spring.

On the other hand, different idealizations from different stakeholders of politics have revealed over time. To one extent, As a result of different idealizations, Egyptians have started experiencing a pressed version of the internal political battle of Turkey though the political backgrounds of Turkey and Egypt are not quite similar. In fact, the existence of ‘negativity’ has been missing for years in the cybernetics of governing in both countries because the idealized political systems had only the positive stakeholders. In response to this dramatic situation, public spaces (such as Taksim Square or/and Tahrir Square) have become part of the cybernetics of politics in both countries and the riots have become the voice of those who do not agree with the current power holders. In fact, even in an idealized system, the existence of the negatives is already considered at all times due to the fact that the opponents could exist always. The evidence for that is the police. Because the people are always drifting, the police is required. However, gathering in a space is a legal way to show a reaction in an ongoing political process.

From a different perspective, apart from the politics itself, it can be said that secularism is also one of the most significant conflicts in both countries. For both Ancient Egypt and Ottoman Empire, religion was a major component in governing. Being the semi-god of the pharaohs and being the caliph of the sultans are the most remarkable signs of their religious power. Nevertheless, though religion was quite important in the past in terms of maintenance of the power, the religious activities of current power holders result in conflicts in the current political processes of both countries.

While the conflicts among the political stakeholders continue, the nature and the earth take their position in response as well. The architectural and geological transformations on the landscapes accelerate the effects of the anthropocene. Moreover, geopolitical attemps of the governments result that the anthropocene itself becomes a new stakeholder for politics in the long run. This new situation is likely to open a new dimension in the world politics and architecture.

Selman CELIK
Goldsmiths, University of London

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6. List of Figures

Figure 1. Satellite Image of Egypt and the Region.
<http://mapsof.net/map/egypt-satellite-image#.UhJYW7wpf4g>
[last accessed 16/08/2013].

Figure 2. The Standard Pyramid Complex. Lehner, M. (1997) The Complete Pyramids. London: Thames and Hudson. p. 19.

Figure 3. Turkey and Southeastern Anatolia Region.
<http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e3/Latrans-Turkey_location_Southeastern_Anatolia_Region.svg>
[last accessed 22/08/2013].

Figure 4. Satellite Image of Istanbul.
Google Maps.

Figure 5. Planned Canal Istanbul Project.
Google Maps [revised].

Figure 6. Gezi Park Riots in Taksim Square.
<http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dosya:2013_Taksim_Gezi_Park_protests_%2815th_June%29.jpg>
[last accessed 29/08/2013].

Figure 7. Tahrir Square Celebrations, After Mubarak’s Resignation.
<http://thebusysignal.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/slide_17213_239012_huge.jpg>
[last accessed 29/08/2013].


[1] Virginie Mamadouh, ‘Geopolitics in the Nineties: One Flag, Many Meanings’, GeoJournal, 46/4 (1998), pp. 237-253.
[2] Terje Tvedt, The Nile: An Annotated Bibliography (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p. 7.
[3] ibid.
[4] Bruce Trigger, Barry Kemp and David O’Connor, Ancient Egypt: A Social History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 6.
[5] ibid., p. 9.
[6] op.cit., p. 8.
[7] Bill Manley, The Penguin Historical Atlas of Ancient Egypt (London: Penguin Books, 1996), p. 13.
[8] ibid.
[9] John Baines and Jaromir Malek, Cultural Atlas of Ancient Egypt (New York: Checkmark Books, 2000), p. 15.
[10] op.cit., p. 18.
[11] Derek Varble, The Suez Crisis (New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2009), p. 9.
[12] ibid., p. 5.
[13] ibid.
[14] James Fiscus, The Suez Crisis: War and Conflict in the Middle East (New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2004), p. 9.
[15] Mark Lehner, The Complete Pyramids (London: Thames and Hudson, 1997), pp. 8-9.
[16] ibid., pp. 20-35.
[17] ibid., p. 20.
[18] Sergio Donadoni, The Egyptians (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 120-124.
[19] op.cit., pp. 106-107.
[20] ibid., pp. 10-11.
[21] ibid., pp. 12-13.
[22] Ismail Kadare, The Pyramid (London: The Harvill Press, 1996).
[23] op.cit., pp. 8-9.
[24] Ahmet Cetintas, ‘Asiretlerin Sosyal Yapisi Uzerine Sosyolojik Bir Inceleme’ (MA Dissertation, Suleyman Demirel University, 2002), p. 31.
[25] ibid., pp. 100-101.
[26] Suleyman Kaya, ‘Guneydogu Anadolu Bolgesi’nin Ekonomik Yapisi’ (MA Dissertation, Dicle University, 1999), p. 15.
[27] Taha Ozhan and Hatem Ete, ‘Kurt Meselesi, Problemler ve Cozum Onerileri’, Seta Analiz, 1/1 (2008), p. 5.
[28] ibid. p. 9.
[29] ibid. pp. 13-15.
[30] Nilay Ozok, ‘Social Development As a Governmental Strategy In the Southeastern Anatolia Project (MA Dissertation, Bogazici University, 2004), pp. 135-141.
[31] ibid., p. 136.
[32] op.cit., pp. 8-9.
[33] Mensur Akgun and Sylvia Tiryaki, ‘Istanbul Kanalinin Siyasi Fizibilitesi’, GpoT Policy Brief, 27/1 (2011), pp. 1-7.
[34] Christian Keller, ‘Kanal Istanbul: Pipedream or Politics?’, Actuelles de l’Ifri, 1/1 (2012), pp. 1-5.
[35] ibid.
[36] ibid., p. 2.
[37] Nick Wates and Charles Knevitt, Community Architecture: How People Are Creating Their Own Environment (London: Penguin Books, 1987), pp. 15-19.
[38] Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics, or Communication and Control in the Animal and the Machine (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1948).
[39] Robert Meyers, Encyclopedia of Physical Science & Technology (New York: Academic Press, 2001), p. 2.
[40] ibid., p. 3.
[41] Heinz von Foerster, Observing Systems (Seaside: Intersystems Publications, 1981).
[42] Gordon Pask, ‘The Architectural Relevance of Cybernetics’, Architectural Design, 9/1, pp. 494- 496.
[43] Mark Lehner, The Complete Pyramids (London: Thames and Hudson, 1997), p. 20.
[44] ibid.
[45] ibid., p. 224.
[46] Karl Butzer, Early Hydraulic Civilization in Egypt: A Study in Cultural Ecology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).
[47] Kemal H. Karpat, Kisa Turkiye Tarihi 1800-2012 (Istanbul: Timas Yayinlari, 2012), p. 138.
[48] Selman Celik, ‘Taksim Square: A Spatial Centre of the Political Conflicts in Turkey’, April 2013,
[last accessed 27 August 2013].
[49] Hakan Toy and Defne Elmaci, Kronolojik Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi (Istanbul: Karma Kitaplar, 2010), p. 148.
[50] op.cit.
[51] Stratejik Dusunce Enstitusu, ‘Taksim Gezi Parki Eylemleri Raporu’, June 2013, [last accessed 28 August 2013].
[52] ibid.
[53] Ali Korkmaz, ‘Arap Bahari Surecinde Internet ve Sosyal Medyanin Rolu’, International Symposium on Language and Communication: Research Trends and Challenges (ISLC), , pp. 2147-2152. [last accessed 29 August 2013].
[54] Secil Turkmen, ‘Sosyal Medyanin Politik Yasama Etkisi: Arap Bahari Cercevesinde Misir ve Libya Ornegi’, (MA Dissertation, Akdeniz University, 2012), pp. 154-157.
[55] op.cit, p. 2148.
[56] ibid.
[57] Taha Kilinc, ‘Sucu, Secilmis Ilk Baskan Olmak’, Star Newspaper, 06 July 2013.
[58] ibid.
[59] Ali Semin, ‘Misir’da Askeri Darbe ve Ortadoğu’ya Etkileri’, Bilgesam, [last accessed 29 August 2013].
[60] Veysel Ayhan, ‘Misir’da Katliam ve Turkiye’nin Tepkisi: Oneriler Uzerine Dusunmek’, International Middle East Peace Research Center, [last accessed 29 August 2013].
[61] Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (C. Porter, Trans.), (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 46-48.
[62] ibid.